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ESSAY

PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS AND THE
PSYCHOLEGAL ERROR

MORRIS B. HOFFMAN

†

INTRODUCTION
It has been more than a decade since I began railing against the
therapeutic jurisprudence movement in general and drug courts in
1
particular. Much has changed in the world of therapeutic courts in
that decade. Every two-stoplight town now has a drug court, and every
2
three-stoplight one, a veterans court. Every town big enough to claim
to be a community must have a community court. And every court everywhere dealing with low-level crimes must be called a “problem-solving
court.” I guess that makes my felony court a “problem-creating court.”
†

District Judge, Second Judicial District, State of Colorado; Member, The John D.
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation’s Research Network on Law and Neuroscience; Research Fellow, The Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. I want to thank Professor
Stephanos Bibas for inviting me to participate in this sentencing symposium, and the
staff of PENNumbra for all their help with this essay.
1
See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, Commentary, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L.
REV. 1437, 1440 (2000) [hereinafter Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal]; see also Morris
B. Hoffman, A Neo-Retributionist Concurs with Professor Nolan, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1567,
1567-71 (2003); Morris B. Hoffman, The Rehabilitative Ideal and the Drug Court Reality, 14
FED. SENT’G REP. 172, 172-77 (2002); Morris B. Hoffman, A Reply to Messrs. Meyer and
Ritter, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 186, 186-87 (2002); Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes
Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 2083-85 (2002); Morris B. Hoffman, Drug
Courts Don’t Work, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 2008, at 10A.
2
I suggested to my chief judge recently that our newly minted veterans court,
which we deftly shuffled off onto our drug court, which in turn we deftly shuffled off
years ago onto our lower-level courts, be divided between an officer’s court and an enlisted man’s court. No word back yet.
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Much, though, has stayed the same in those ten years. Most of
these courts still do not “work” by any reasonable recidivism-based
measure of that term; they often make things worse by many reasonable measures. Their therapeutic subset relies on a whole addiction
industry that is more snake oil than science or medicine, populated
largely by recovering addicts rather than trained behavioral professionals. These courts have changed parts of the judiciary from a coequal branch of government to a bureaucratic thirteenth step along a
road to social recovery.
But we just celebrated Thanksgiving, my favorite of all holidays, so
3
I have decided not to dwell on these negatives. Instead, I want to examine the question of why it is that these kinds of courts appeal to so
many otherwise perfectly sane and insightful people, and especially to
sane and insightful judges. There seem to be several explanations.
Part of the impetus is the simple desire not to be the last kid on
the block without one. This is a version of the rush to the bottom
phenomenon that we have seen with presumptive drunk driving blood
alcohol levels plummeting nationally, or really with any legislative response to the social problem du jour. But at least these legislative responses are legislative. We expect the vicissitudes of politics to drive legislation. By contrast, the therapeutic jurisprudence movement has
almost exclusively been judge-driven. Yet the politics of problemsolving courts are just as bare-knuckled as attempts at legislative solutions. Mental health advocates, veterans’ groups, and special interest
3

Besides, the problem-solving machine has persisted despite a fairly robust body
of criticism. See, e.g., JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG
COURT MOVEMENT (2001) [hereinafter NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE]; Richard C.
Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1205, 1252-69 (1998) (discussing the challenges defense attorneys face defending
clients in drug treatment court); Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 783, 786 (2008) (arguing that drug courts are least effective at helping the people
they are designed to help the most—genuine addicts); Tamar M. Meekins, “Specialized
Justice”: The Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and the Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 47-50 (2006) (highlighting concerns of losing the defense attorney as advocate in problem-solving courts); James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining
Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving and the Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541,
1554-62 (2003) (investigating the unexpected consequences of problem-solving
courts); Mae C. Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement: Domination of Discourse and Untold Stories of Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 57, 62-68
(2009) (noting concerns of the criminal defense bar relating to problem-solving
courts, and questioning the courts’ efficacy); Jane M. Spinak, Reforming Family Court:
Getting It Right between Rhetoric and Reality, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 33-38 (2009)
(questioning the efficacy of problem-solving family courts); Developments in the Law-Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1917-19 (1998) (expressing concern over the lack of procedural safeguards in drug courts).
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agglomerations of all kinds relentlessly lobby chief judges and other
local officials to create courts for whatever is the latest problemsolving fad for the latest self-described victims’ group.
But it’s not just politics. Problem-solving courts of all types have
4
infected appointed judiciaries as much as elected ones. Drug courts
5
have even found their way into the federal system, albeit belatedly.
Another explanation is darker. Drug courts in particular are
popular with judges and with judicial bureaucrats because drug courts
typically drive case numbers up, and come budget time there is nothing sweeter to a chief judge than a big fat caseload. Filings go up because most drug courts trigger a phenomenon called net-widening:
the existence of the drug court itself stimulates more case filings. The
mechanisms of net-widening are not always clear, and they probably
differ across jurisdictions and maybe even over time. But the effects
can be significant. In Denver, where I preside, drug filings almost
tripled one year after the institution of our drug court compared with
6
one year before. A big part of the net-widening phenomenon is pretty straightforward: police and prosecutors are no longer trying to
detect crime; they are trolling for patients. Arrests that might never
be made in the shadow of a truth-finding system get regularly made
when guilt and truth are irrelevant. Cases that prosecutors would
never have filed if they actually had to be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt are regularly filed in therapeutic systems, where a not guilty
plea is called denial, and proof is all back-loaded to the question of
7
whether a defendant complied with required therapy.
My guess is that the uptick in case filings is more than offset by a
decrease in the time the therapeutic judge devotes to each case.
That’s because a cadre of other actors typically helps the therapeutic
judge push the cases through, from magistrates and designated court
staff, to designated probation staff, and even to counsel themselves,
who are forced to abandon their traditional adversary role to become

4

There are drug courts in all fifty states, thus including the states that are purely
appointment states. Drug Courts, NAT’L INST. JUST., http://nij.gov/topics/courts/drugcourts/welcome.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). As of June 30, 2010, a total of 2559
drug courts existed in the United States,. Id.
5
As of June 30, 2010, there were fifty-seven federal drug courts. Id.
6
See Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, supra note 1, at 1502 n.260 (showing that
drug filings grew from 1047 in 1993, the first full year before implementation of our
drug court, to 2661 in 1995, the first full year after implementation of our drug court).
7
See generally NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 201-04.
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8

part of the treatment “team.” All of this means that, despite the fact
that drug court judges spend untold hours cajoling and cheerleading
their “clients” toward the promised land of recovery, their time per
case probably goes down significantly because they have so much help
from everyone else, help that judges in regular problem-creating courts
do not have. More cases, less judge-time per case. What looks better to
a chief judge fighting other chief judges for shares of the budget pie?
But these explanations are not just unduly cynical, they probably
miss the heart of the matter. I suspect that the deepest and most
complete explanation of the problem-solving phenomenon is pretty
simple: every day we see people in our courtrooms with profound
problems, and we naturally want to help. We know that punishment
alone does not solve any of these problems and that the crimes that
bring these people into our courtrooms seem to be the tip of an iceberg of dysfunction. It is terribly tempting for judges to use the coercive power of the judicial branch to try to help the people who come
before us. I cannot count the numbers of times I have heard treatment court judges say things like, “We finally have their attention; now
we can help them.” I know many colleagues, both in my own court
and in courts across the country, who believe sincerely and passionately in the curative power of their therapeutic mission; indeed, this
movement owes its incubation and sustenance to a core of truly remarkable and dedicated judges.
But that doesn’t make them right. In fact, if the simple human
desire to help explains the growth of the therapeutic jurisprudence
movement, then it strangely fails to explain the movement’s sharp limitations. There are no aggravated robbery courts where we try to
solve the social problems of armed robbers, or community rape courts
where we encourage rapists to apologize to victims so we can heal the
9
community’s wounds. We do not give pedophiles serial probation
and community service until they either reform or call our bluff. Our
veterans courts do not seem too interested in veterans who kidnap
and murder. Why the oddly truncated reach of a movement with such
seemingly unbounded and hopeful activism?

8

For an engaging and thoughtful discussion of the ethical issues this presents to
defense counsel, see Boldt, supra note 3, at 1286-1300.
9
I should clarify that I am not talking about so-called “reentry courts,” which address the problem of reintegration rather than the social dislocation that caused offenders to commit the crime in the first place. I think such courts are great, though
they are really just making up for what corrections officials should be doing.
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It is not enough just to say that problem-solving courts are to jus10
tice what the broken-windows theory is to policing, though there are
some tempting similarities. It is entirely plausible that cleaning up
low-level crime might have a positive impact on more serious crimes,
whether that low-level cleanup comes from police activity or therapeu11
tic court activity. But that is very much not the goal of most problem12
solving courts. To their credit, they do not set out to save the world
or even their own communities. The problems they are interested in
solving are on a much smaller scale. They are just trying to save the
people who come before them from the impacts of the social problems that brought them into court—problems that if left unsolved will
just keep them coming back.
And that is one of the impossible challenges of the movement.
No self-respecting treatment judge would be so smug as to claim to be
able, let alone authorized, to solve all of modern society’s ills. We
cannot order teenagers to refrain from getting pregnant at thirteen,
or fathers and mothers to avoid abandoning their children, or schools
to teach, or parents to parent. But once all these social failures coalesce into an individual drug user or graffiti artist or shoplifter, some
judges suddenly think they can “fix” the individuals whose behavior is
a product of these failed systems.
I chuckle at problem-solving enthusiasts who claim they are getting at the “causes” of the problems, while we in problem-creating
courts are just dealing with the “effects.” It is simply not true. One
link in the causal chain does not a cause make. No teen court judge
10

The broken-windows theory postulates that reducing the incidence of low-level
crimes like vandalism will have norm-setting signaling effects that will reduce more serious crimes. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows, ATLANTIC, March 1982, at 29, 34.
11
The broken-windows theory is not without its detractors. See, e.g., Bernard E.
Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City
Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 304-07 (2006) (arguing that, under the broken-windows approach, serious crime simply relocates). Though therapeutic courts
are famous for their grossly overly optimistic recidivism statistics, I am unaware of any
studies that claim they also have a positive impact on the frequency of more serious
crimes, which may itself say something about whether the proponents of therapeutic
jurisprudence really see themselves as broken-windows warriors.
12
For example, here’s the Minnesota Judicial Branch’s published statement about
the purposes of its problem-solving courts: The problem-solving court “works closely
with prosecutors, public defenders, probation officers, social workers, and other justice
system partners to develop a strategy that will pressure an offender into completing a
treatment program and abstaining from repeating the behaviors that brought them to
court.” Problem-Solving Courts, MINN. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=
626 (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
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thinks he can solve the aching loneliness inherent in adolescence,
even though a nice judicial pep talk might make everyone feel good
for a while. Even the boldest of veterans court judges do not think
they have a mandate to end war in an effort to stop war-related posttraumatic stress disorder. These courts are dealing exclusively in effects, not in causes; they just happen to be focusing on a different set
of effects than the one that brought their patient to them (and I
might add, the only one that gives the court the power to act). But I
also think that this claim about dealing with “causes” may be the key
to understanding our addiction to problem-solving courts.
I. THE PSYCHOLEGAL ERROR
My friend Professor Stephen Morse coined a fantastic term—the
“fundamental psycholegal error”—to describe the powerful tempta13
tion we all seem to have to equate cause with excuse. But of course
cause is not excuse. Everything has a cause, and every cause has an
antecedent cause. If cause were excuse, then all wrongs would be excused. But nothing about the chain of causation, precisely because
such a chain lies behind every action, can ever in and of itself inform
us about responsibility. Knowing that the defendant was abused and
tormented by her spouse makes us feel like we understand the mind
that decided to kill him while he was sleeping, but understanding that
such a killing has such a “cause” does not excuse the killing any more
than understanding that you needed money for your heroin habit
excuses you from robbing the grocery store.
True excuse, of the insanity variety, involves the brain’s profound
14
loss of rationality. And a “cause” is seldom so rationality-distorting as
to be an excuse. Andrea Yates was excused because her actions were
caused by a profoundly distorted view of the world—her children would
15
be consigned to hell if she did not kill them. When is sheer anger,
fear, or craving so rationality-distorting as to amount to an excuse?
There is no easy answer to that question, except to say that the law’s an-

13

Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual
Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 350-53 (1998).
14
See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente between Legal Insanity and Mens Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1071, 1096 (2007) (“People are found legally insane because they lack rational capacity or, more controversially, because they cannot conform their behavior to the
requirements of law.”).
15
Jury Finds Yates Insane, Not Guilty, HOUS. CHRON., July 26, 2006, at A1.
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16

swer is “almost never.” And so far that has been a wise answer, because
to engage any more broadly in this inquiry risks the problem that none
of us really knows what “causes” any of our decisions, and that all of us
17
could therefore claim to be relieved of responsibility altogether.
So what has all of this to do with problem-solving courts? Everything, since the “problems” that problem-solving courts are trying to
solve are the immediately antecedent causes of criminal behavior. In
problem-creating courts like mine, we just punish people for their
18
wrongs. But problem-solving courts try to get at least one level deeper in the cause-and-effect chain, and then treat that cause instead of
punishing its effect, because in problem-solving courts the antecedent
cause excuses the crime. Problem-solving courts literally institutionalize the psycholegal error. When Johnny tags the local church, he is
not just tagging a church. He is acting out because of something
going on in his life. When our problem-solving courts discover that
something—dysfunctional family, drugs, problems at school, all of the
above—and Johnny takes steps to cure himself, albeit with a little bit
of coercion, we excuse the tagging.
This is not only a wholly unprecedented expansion of the doctrine
of excuse, but it is all being done quite silently in the alternate universe that is therapeutic jurisprudence. Treatment courts do not admit that they are “excusing” their “clients,” but that is exactly what
they are doing, particularly in courts where, as is very common, the
treatment component is enforced by way of conditions to a deferred
16

Short of insanity, that answer is embedded, on the excuse side, largely in what is
left of the doctrine of irresistible impulse, and on the justification side, in doctrines
like self-defense and duress.
17
This problem of the end of responsibility is coming to a head, so to speak, as
neuroscientists dig deeper and deeper into the neuronal chain of causation. Some
legal philosophers have argued that what neuroscience will ultimately discover is that
none of us is a responsible moral agent and none of us can therefore hold anyone else
morally responsible, though most admit that we should nevertheless remain steadfast
in holding to the illusion. See, e.g., DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS
WILL 334 (2002). Thankfully, the law has held fast to its compatibalist traditions. A
neuroscientist once complained to me about how I could punish anyone for anything,
when we all knew that our decisions were just neurons all the way down and that no
one could really help themselves. I replied that I in turn could not help myself. He
did not seem satisfied, but in fact there is a rich psychological, primatological, and now
even neuroscientific literature suggesting that we all have powerful and evolved instincts to punish. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 63, 85 (2004).
18
Yes, yes, even problem-creating courts engage in the fiction of probation, which
many of my drug court friends would claim is just a less informed version of treatment
courts. No doubt there is a continuum between the rehabilitative aspects of ordinary
probation and its most robust form as a treatment court.
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judgment. When the miscreant successfully completes treatment, we
absolve him completely of his responsibility, because you see he did
not commit a wrong; it was those other causes that did it.
Which brings us to the puzzle of addiction. Like most aspects of
human behavior, and especially human decisionmaking, very little is
really known about the neurology of addiction. Yes, neuroimaging
has made important inroads—there seems to be no doubt that addiction is bound up with the brain’s risk/reward circuits, and more particularly with problems in the ways that various neurotransmitters, es19
pecially dopamine, give us our sense of pleasure. An addict needs
more and more of his drug because his dopamine is responding less
20
and less. Genes have also been discovered that reduce the effect of
dopamine, confirming that there can be a genetic predisposition to
21
addiction. But as is often the case with discoveries about the brain,
what we learn about a narrow area seems only to open more questions in larger ones.
In the case of the dopaminergic model of addiction, the problem
is that these same dopamine-driven risk/reward circuits are involved
22
in all of our decisionmaking behaviors. Every time we decide to listen to pleasing music or eat a bag of potato chips or have an orgasm,
these same circuits not only gin up our dopamine in the same basic
way that anticipating a snort of cocaine does, but there also seems to
be the same tolerance phenomenon of increased use requiring increased amounts of dopamine for the same kick. We get “addicted” in
some fundamental way to every pleasurable experience we have,
which of course, within limits, makes perfect evolutionary sense. It is

19

See generally Steven E. Hyman et al., Neural Mechanisms of Addiction: The Role of
Reward-Related Learning and Memory, 29 ANN. REV. NEUROSCI. 565, 570-75 (2006) (analyzing the central role of dopamine in understanding addictive behavior).
20
See Nora D. Volkow et al., Role of Dopamine, the Frontal Cortex and Memory Circuits
in Drug Addiction: Insight from Imaging Studies, 78 NEUROBIOLOGY OF LEARNING & MEMORY 610, 611 (2002) (noting that drug addiction may result from the repeated perturbation of the dopamine system).
21
See B. Le Foll et al, Dopamine D3 Receptor Agents as Potential New Medications for
Drug Addiction, 15 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 140, 140-41 (2000) (analyzing the effect of defects
in the D3 receptor gene).
22
Marc N. Potenza, Should Addictive Disorders Include Non-Substance-Related Conditions?, 101 ADDICTION (Supp. 1) 142, 142, 148 (2006). On the other hand, there are
indications that the dopamine released by anticipated drug use is released in a
slightly different location than the dopamine released in anticipation of nondrug
behaviors. Valentina Bassareo et al, Differential Adaptive Properties of Accumbens Shell
Dopamine Responses to Ethanol as a Drug and as a Motivational Stimulus, 17 EUR. J. NEUROSCI. 1465, 1471 (2003).
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nature’s way of helping us remember certain experiences and increasing the likelihood we will repeat them, since things like having orgasms would have been really important evolutionary things to do.
Somehow, most of our brains are able to maintain a satisfying level
of pleasure without having to overindulge. But others of us, across a
whole array of pleasurable behaviors, not just using drugs, and also at
different times in our lives depending on factors such as our levels of
stress, need more and more indulgence to maintain the same level of
dopamine-driven satisfaction. We need to eat a whole bag of potato
chips, or have eight drinks instead of two. At the extreme, addicts are
not getting any pleasure at all from their drug of choice—they just
need it to get to sleep or avoid convulsions. For them, the reward part
of the risk/reward circuit has become so muted that they cannot get
their levels of dopamine up to pleasurable amounts, no matter how
much of their drug they take. Their pleasure circuits have become
23
dopamine-starved pain circuits.
But because we know so little about what really makes cocaine different from, say, sex or potato chips, we likewise know very little about
when one kind of behavior should be treated as a “choice” for purposes of responsibility and another kind treated like the product of an
excused cause—the excuse of addiction.
The law has always been conflicted over these difficult concepts of
choice and compulsion. Voluntary intoxication is traditionally not a
defense, either affirmatively or to negate general mens rea, even
though the drunk killer’s state of mind is probably the same whether
he is a teetotaler and achieved that state of mind from his first-ever
drink or he is an alcoholic and achieved that state of mind after twelve
drinks. The law, in its wisdom, has generally recognized that to
excuse an addict’s drug use as “involuntary” might open up the floodgates of excuse and risk the end of responsibility. Even modern law,
after having been schooled for decades about the “disease” of addiction, does not recognize it as an excuse, instinctively and quite rightly
appreciating what neuroscience only now seems to be confirming:
that all “decisions” are a complex integration of emotion, cognition,
risk-taking and pleasure-seeking, that addiction may just be a way of
describing one end of that continuum, and that without knowing

23

For a comprehensive, current, and enjoyably accessible introduction to the neurobiology of addiction, see DAVID J. LINDEN, THE COMPASS OF PLEASURE: HOW OUR
BRAINS MAKE FATTY FOODS, ORGASM, EXERCISE, MARIJUANA, GENEROSITY, VODKA,
LEARNING, AND GAMBLING FEEL SO GOOD (2011).
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more about the neurology of decisionmaking, excusing one end of
that continuum may require us to excuse the whole of it.
So when it comes to the criminal decisions of addicted minds, the
law has remained fairly unimpressed with the therapeutic movement,
and largely resistant to the lure of the psycholegal error. When an
addict rapes a coworker, his addiction is not the “cause” of the rape—
even if we could be metaphysically sure that the rape never would
24
have happened if he were sober—and it is almost never an excuse.
And yet, when that same addict is charged with the crime of possessing the drug to which he is addicted, the addiction suddenly becomes
the cause of his possession, and in therapeutic courts a complete
excuse, as long as he plays the game and responds to our treatment.
But if the addict in both cases does not “choose” to use, then how can
the addict-rapist’s use be ignored under the rubric of voluntary intoxication? In both cases, under the therapeutic model, the addict had
no choice but to use. Yet our problem-solving courts excuse the crime
of continued use but not the crime of drug-induced rape. Why?
II. LEGALIZATION BY JUDICIAL FIAT
The answer seems clear: therapeutic courts treat an addict’s drug
use as “involuntary” when considering the crime of drug use, but “voluntary” when considering any sort of more serious general intent
crime, simply because therapeutic courts do not believe drug use
should be a crime. That is a perfectly reasonable belief, and in fact is
an approach that seems to be gaining traction with many thoughtful
people. But of course it is not typically the judicial branch that decides what should and should not be a crime. Despite the constant
haranguing about of the disease theory of addiction, our legislatures
have by and large remained unmoved. Drug use remains a crime, but
it has been functionally decriminalized by a segment of the judiciary
that simply disagrees with that approach.
The same is true for almost all manner of problem-solving courts.
These courts are not just meant to treat the underlying problem that
caused the minor crime, they are in fact meant only to treat the underlying problem and not the crime itself. Thus, when defendants in
problem-solving courts are punished, they generally are punished for
failing our proffered treatment, not for engaging in the underlying
act. Here again, judges have decided that shoplifting or vandalism or
24

There may be extreme cases where an addiction has progressed to the point of other
serious and potentially excusable mental disorders, like substance-induced psychoses.
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other low-level crimes are simply not serious enough to warrant punishment on their own, even though legislative bodies have criminalized these activities. Like police and prosecutors, these courts do not
care about the crimes that bring their defendants to them; the crimes
are just a useful vehicle by which the court can gain these diseased
people’s attention, and, by using the threat of punishment, try to cure
25
their social problems.
So the answer to the troubling question of why there are no problem-solving kidnapping or pedophilia courts is that there is just not a
large body of judges that believes kidnapping or pedophilia should be
legalized. That is, all this judicial falderol about how nothing we are
doing seems to be working, and how judges need to be more proactive
in helping their communities, is largely just a cover for legalization.
When problem-solving judges say traditional courts do not work for
some of these special crimes, what they are really saying is that criminalization is not working. They may or may not be right about that, but
they are not members of the branch authorized to make that judgment.

Preferred Citation: Morris B. Hoffman, Essay, Problem-Solving
Courts and the Psycholegal Error, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 129
(2011), http://www.pennumbra.com/essays/12-2011/Hoffman.pdf.

25

Not all problem-solving courts are so purely therapeutic. Some mete out punishment in parallel to their therapeutic efforts. I applaud those courts. Most DUI
courts are of this variety, presumably because few, if any, judges think driving drunk
should be legalized or excused by addiction—even though, right across the hall, a heroin addiction is certainly viewed as excusing the crime of heroin possession.

